Iran’s recent withdrawal from nuclear talks with the US indicates a hardening of its stance and growing frustration with the diplomatic process. However, while this move may embolden Iran rhetorically, it also underscores the high stakes involved. Launching a direct military strike against Israel would risk a massive retaliatory response—including from US-backed Israeli forces—and could plunge the region into a broader conflict. This inherent risk tempers the likelihood of Iran committing its national military forces to an all-out strike.
2. **Historical Preference for Proxy Engagement:**
Historically, Iran has avoided direct military confrontations with Israel by relying on proxy forces such as Hezbollah. Iranian proxies allow Tehran to exert pressure while maintaining a degree of plausible deniability. A direct strike by the national military forces—which includes elements like the Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Law Enforcement Forces—would represent a significant escalation beyond past practices. Thus, even amid heightened tensions following the breakdown in nuclear talks, Iran is more likely to continue using proxies rather than risking a full-scale direct attack.
3. **Operational and Strategic Calculus:**
The potential consequences of a direct strike are profound. Such an action would likely trigger an immediate, devastating response from Israel—and possibly its allies—leading to a spiral of retaliation that could be catastrophic for Iran. Given these operational risks and the leadership’s awareness of the costs of miscalculation, the probability that Iran will choose direct military action remains comparatively low.
4. **Balancing Emboldenment with Restraint:**
While the collapse of the nuclear talks might push some elements within the Iranian leadership to consider more aggressive posturing, the combined pressures of deterrence, potential counter-escalation, and the regime’s traditional reliance on indirect methods still argue against direct intervention. This balance leads to an assessment that there is roughly a 30% chance Iran's national military forces will attempt such a strike before 1 November 2025.
Why do you think you're right? (optional)
Good day,
**Rationale**
1. **Diplomatic and Political Signaling:**
Iran’s recent withdrawal from nuclear talks with the US indicates a hardening of its stance and growing frustration with the diplomatic process. However, while this move may embolden Iran rhetorically, it also underscores the high stakes involved. Launching a direct military strike against Israel would risk a massive retaliatory response—including from US-backed Israeli forces—and could plunge the region into a broader conflict. This inherent risk tempers the likelihood of Iran committing its national military forces to an all-out strike.
2. **Historical Preference for Proxy Engagement:**
Historically, Iran has avoided direct military confrontations with Israel by relying on proxy forces such as Hezbollah. Iranian proxies allow Tehran to exert pressure while maintaining a degree of plausible deniability. A direct strike by the national military forces—which includes elements like the Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Law Enforcement Forces—would represent a significant escalation beyond past practices. Thus, even amid heightened tensions following the breakdown in nuclear talks, Iran is more likely to continue using proxies rather than risking a full-scale direct attack.
3. **Operational and Strategic Calculus:**
The potential consequences of a direct strike are profound. Such an action would likely trigger an immediate, devastating response from Israel—and possibly its allies—leading to a spiral of retaliation that could be catastrophic for Iran. Given these operational risks and the leadership’s awareness of the costs of miscalculation, the probability that Iran will choose direct military action remains comparatively low.
4. **Balancing Emboldenment with Restraint:**
While the collapse of the nuclear talks might push some elements within the Iranian leadership to consider more aggressive posturing, the combined pressures of deterrence, potential counter-escalation, and the regime’s traditional reliance on indirect methods still argue against direct intervention. This balance leads to an assessment that there is roughly a 30% chance Iran's national military forces will attempt such a strike before 1 November 2025.
Why might you be wrong?
Bad data