The research is rather limited because it looks at violent regime changes (aka revolutions). There are more way a regime change can happen so all the probabilities need to be adjusted.

Here is some data relevant for the question. For regimes that initiated wars and lost them the regime change by violence within 3 years is 60-80%. For an initiator that won the probability is 20-35%. Because there are multiple other ways to change the regime i think these probabilities need to be doubled, and since we are looking only at 1 year frame, then I would divide them by 3.

So we have 40-55% in case of Russian loss and 13-23% in case of win.

Assuming there is a 40% chance of win - then the probability of regime change is 35%.

I infer a base rate of regime change of about 7% per year, which would apply until the conflict is resolved.

Assuming a 30% quick resolution then the regime change probability ends up being around 15%.

I will have to adjust upward this probability if a resolution to the war comes closer or if the win of Ukraine becomes more apparent.

My hat is off to you for thinking of trying to research the chances of regime change after a war has been initiated. I thought, "WoW! this is some cool stuff" when I read it.

Then I got to your statement, "Because there are multiple other ways to change the regime i think these probabilities need to be doubled. .. " I wish you had fleshed out your thinking on the other ways that regime changes can occur and why you think the probabilities should be doubled.

Maybe i've not had enough coffee yet this morning and am not firing on all neurons, but it appears to me that you have your statement backwards here: "we have 40-55% in case of Russian win and 13-23% in case of loss." Why would the possibility of a regime change be higher in the case of a win than for a loss? "

but it appears to me that you have your statement backwards here: "we have 40-55% in case of Russian win and 13-23% in case of loss."

Yes you are right. That was a mistake. Thanks for pointing out and i corrected that.

On the doubling the probability is because the research looked at violent changes of regime after war. There can be non-violent changes and many more possibilities: Putin leaves voluntarily or runs off as the pressure mounts, political rivals depose Putin and he goes through court for corruption or other stuff, a successor is named by Putin himself with guarantees for his safety, he is assassinated, he is forced to make elections where he doesn't participate etc. So there are many more possibilities of a regime change than violent.

if you look here at this research https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414019879953 the four main ways for regime changes are: direct transition, military coup and liberalization by sitting regime and loss in inter-state war. Here we can roughly see two non-violent changes, military coup can be both and loss in interstate war as well. But the fact that non-violent changes actually take a lion share made me double the probabilities I got from violent changes of regime. I hope that helps clarify and I am happy for any additional feedback. However, doubling is a bit of shooting from the hip :D

Thanks for acknowledging that I wasn't bonkers! I'd actually read your statement several times before I said, "Hey, wait a minute . . . " LOL!

Thanks, too, for explaining that doubling was just a bit of shooting from the hip. Of course, all forecasting is shooting from the hip! Sometimes, though, we can explain why we're shooting in a particular direction. LOL! What I hadn't realized was that the research you cited had looked at only violent changes of regime. I agree that if we looked for the rate of non-violent regime changes, it might end up being equal to the rate of violent change, so that you're probably correct to double things.

So i looked through this research. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/war-and-the-fate-of-regimes-a-comparative-analysis/88056B8C9BE0413DB349086653B58520

The research is rather limited because it looks at violent regime changes (aka revolutions). There are more way a regime change can happen so all the probabilities need to be adjusted.

Here is some data relevant for the question. For regimes that initiated wars and lost them the regime change by violence within 3 years is 60-80%. For an initiator that won the probability is 20-35%. Because there are multiple other ways to change the regime i think these probabilities need to be doubled, and since we are looking only at 1 year frame, then I would divide them by 3.

So we have 40-55% in case of Russian loss and 13-23% in case of win.

Assuming there is a 40% chance of win - then the probability of regime change is 35%.

I infer a base rate of regime change of about 7% per year, which would apply until the conflict is resolved.

Assuming a 30% quick resolution then the regime change probability ends up being around 15%.

I will have to adjust upward this probability if a resolution to the war comes closer or if the win of Ukraine becomes more apparent.

@julick,

My hat is off to you for thinking of trying to research the chances of regime change after a war has been initiated. I thought, "WoW! this is some cool stuff" when I read it.

Then I got to your statement, "Because there are multiple other ways to change the regime i think these probabilities need to be doubled. .. " I wish you had fleshed out your thinking on the other ways that regime changes can occur and why you think the probabilities should be doubled.

Maybe i've not had enough coffee yet this morning and am not firing on all neurons, but it appears to me that you have your statement backwards here: "

we have 40-55% in case of Russian win and 13-23% in case of loss."Why would the possibility of a regime change be higher in the case of a win than for a loss? "Yes you are right. That was a mistake. Thanks for pointing out and i corrected that.

On the doubling the probability is because the research looked at

violentchanges of regime after war. There can benon-violentchanges and many more possibilities: Putin leaves voluntarily or runs off as the pressure mounts, political rivals depose Putin and he goes through court for corruption or other stuff, a successor is named by Putin himself with guarantees for his safety, he is assassinated, he is forced to make elections where he doesn't participate etc. So there are many more possibilities of a regime change than violent.if you look here at this research https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414019879953 the four main ways for regime changes are: direct transition, military coup and liberalization by sitting regime and loss in inter-state war. Here we can roughly see two non-violent changes, military coup can be both and loss in interstate war as well. But the fact that non-violent changes actually take a lion share made me double the probabilities I got from violent changes of regime. I hope that helps clarify and I am happy for any additional feedback. However, doubling is a bit of shooting from the hip :D

@julick,

Thanks for acknowledging that I wasn't bonkers! I'd actually read your statement several times before I said, "Hey, wait a minute . . . " LOL!

Thanks, too, for explaining that doubling was just a bit of shooting from the hip. Of course, all forecasting is shooting from the hip! Sometimes, though, we can explain why we're shooting in a particular direction. LOL! What I hadn't realized was that the research you cited had looked at only violent changes of regime. I agree that if we looked for the rate of non-violent regime changes, it might end up being equal to the rate of violent change, so that you're probably correct to double things.

Thanks for the information and discussion!