Reverting back to September 2015 NONE of many well thought out GJ discussions &, obvious possibilities of Assad's demise have come to fruition.
Fast forward a year later today, Iran, Russia &, Turkey are developing a combined compelling, vested interest, in maintaining the Assad led Syrian Government status quo WELL BEYOND the resolution date of this GJ Q 1/3/17.
The evidence is increasingly convincing especially as this past year, the geopolitical circumstances have changed, in certain situations, dramatically. Yet, Assad remains in power.
For example, Putin today openly argues for a "patient change". (FN1) Iran, on the other hand, is adamant in its support for Assad.(2)
Additionally, post the LACK of any resolution on the Syrian Q at this weekends G20 meeting btw US & Russia, NB attached source that CLAIMS an effort is presently being made by Putin to call a **MOSCOW SUMMIT** later this month 18-22 September btw Erdogan, Assad & Putin.(3).
CAVEAT: Whether such a "Summit" takes place, is an open question.
Another critical question is, however what factor China plays, in this complex end game scenario which, is worth serious consideration. (4)
Here is why.
Assad's existence hangs on the thread of Iranian, Russian &, increasing Turkish interests to carve up, amongst themselves, post Assad's departure, what Syrian geographical & historical opportunities this complex TRIPARTITE can EXTRACT after Assad's departure. This requires time, organization & agreement btw all parties well beyond the resolution date of this GJ Q.
Clearly, EU & US interests have been left by the geopolitical wayside. Why? Neither has a clear and compelling vested interest nor justification to officially declare a State of War with the Government of Syria on the one hand (5) nor, are they willing to make a MAJOR POLITICAL commitments to finding a proper political equilibrium for Syria on the other hand.
The "half way" measures taken to date, have arguably created greater complexity to a fundamentally irresolvable ME dilemma.
Rather, the political strategy of the West has been to avoid "Mission Creep" involvement. A problem both the Russians & Iranians also must now avoid.
NB: even CIA Director Brennan raises the question of "what that Syrian endgame means". (6)
No one disputes why Assad must go. (7)
More critically, since the attempted military coup of Erdogan in Turkey, there has been an undeniable "relative convergence" of interests btw Turkey & Russia versus the United States, in any event.
Why?
This question is important because it raises a number of additional critical questions.
1) Did Putin and his intelligence apparatus, have either prior knowledge or, good reason to believe, that Erdogan "could/would" be subject to an attempted Military Coup(8)?
2) Did Putin gain w/ Erdogan a certain amount of political good will by providing notice prior thereto ? (8)
3) What effect did/does ( forward looking!) this have on Erdogan's previous "my way, or the highway" view of Assad having to go, immediately?
4) Does this chain of events provide Putin with additional influence to bring Erdogan into the Russian/Iranian fold on providing indirect/direct support for Assad? (8)
5) Is China now an indirect Syrian support for this complex tripartite of Russia, Iranian & Turkish interests in Syria? (4)
6) Under such complex geopolitical stakes, what are national security reasons for direct & indirect involvement by the U.S. in Syria at this stage ? (5)
CONCLUSION:
Possibilities such as military coup, assassination, accidental injury resulting in death,bad health or the like continue to exist. These possibilities justify assigning a 2% probability through resolution period.
However, when balanced against the above mention facts & changing circumstances,
along w/ causal connections attached thereto, there is a very real probability Assad remain President of Syria b/y 1/3/17.
@BG1 1) Did Putin and his intelligence apparatus, have either prior knowledge or, good reason to believe, that Erdogan "could/would" be subject to an attempted Military Coup(8)?
Based on this recent article that crossed my screen a few days ago, I am reasonably confident that Russian intelligence had prior knowledge of the coup. Replace Czech with Turkey.
EUObserver (opinion), September 2, 'Czech intelligence alarmed by Russian 'threat': https://euobserver.com/opinion/134890 See section on 'Russian Objectives'.
Reducing 3 to 2%
Reasoning:
Comment Update:
Reverting back to September 2015 NONE of many well thought out GJ discussions &, obvious possibilities of Assad's demise have come to fruition.
Fast forward a year later today, Iran, Russia &, Turkey are developing a combined compelling, vested interest, in maintaining the Assad led Syrian Government status quo WELL BEYOND the resolution date of this GJ Q 1/3/17.
The evidence is increasingly convincing especially as this past year, the geopolitical circumstances have changed, in certain situations, dramatically. Yet, Assad remains in power.
For example, Putin today openly argues for a "patient change". (FN1) Iran, on the other hand, is adamant in its support for Assad.(2)
Additionally, post the LACK of any resolution on the Syrian Q at this weekends G20 meeting btw US & Russia, NB attached source that CLAIMS an effort is presently being made by Putin to call a **MOSCOW SUMMIT** later this month 18-22 September btw Erdogan, Assad & Putin.(3).
CAVEAT: Whether such a "Summit" takes place, is an open question.
Another critical question is, however what factor China plays, in this complex end game scenario which, is worth serious consideration. (4)
Here is why.
Assad's existence hangs on the thread of Iranian, Russian &, increasing Turkish interests to carve up, amongst themselves, post Assad's departure, what Syrian geographical & historical opportunities this complex TRIPARTITE can EXTRACT after Assad's departure. This requires time, organization & agreement btw all parties well beyond the resolution date of this GJ Q.
Clearly, EU & US interests have been left by the geopolitical wayside. Why? Neither has a clear and compelling vested interest nor justification to officially declare a State of War with the Government of Syria on the one hand (5) nor, are they willing to make a MAJOR POLITICAL commitments to finding a proper political equilibrium for Syria on the other hand.
The "half way" measures taken to date, have arguably created greater complexity to a fundamentally irresolvable ME dilemma.
Rather, the political strategy of the West has been to avoid "Mission Creep" involvement. A problem both the Russians & Iranians also must now avoid.
NB: even CIA Director Brennan raises the question of "what that Syrian endgame means". (6)
No one disputes why Assad must go. (7)
More critically, since the attempted military coup of Erdogan in Turkey, there has been an undeniable "relative convergence" of interests btw Turkey & Russia versus the United States, in any event.
Why?
This question is important because it raises a number of additional critical questions.
1) Did Putin and his intelligence apparatus, have either prior knowledge or, good reason to believe, that Erdogan "could/would" be subject to an attempted Military Coup(8)?
2) Did Putin gain w/ Erdogan a certain amount of political good will by providing notice prior thereto ? (8)
3) What effect did/does ( forward looking!) this have on Erdogan's previous "my way, or the highway" view of Assad having to go, immediately?
4) Does this chain of events provide Putin with additional influence to bring Erdogan into the Russian/Iranian fold on providing indirect/direct support for Assad? (8)
5) Is China now an indirect Syrian support for this complex tripartite of Russia, Iranian & Turkish interests in Syria? (4)
6) Under such complex geopolitical stakes, what are national security reasons for direct & indirect involvement by the U.S. in Syria at this stage ? (5)
CONCLUSION:
Possibilities such as military coup, assassination, accidental injury resulting in death,bad health or the like continue to exist. These possibilities justify assigning a 2% probability through resolution period.
However, when balanced against the above mention facts & changing circumstances,
along w/ causal connections attached thereto, there is a very real probability Assad remain President of Syria b/y 1/3/17.
Source Guide: *****
1) http://sputniknews.com/middleeast/20160902/1044887700/putin-assad-ouster-patience.html
2) https://mobile.almasdarnews.com/article/iran-reiterates-support-syria/ ; http://www.tehrantimes.com/news/406048/Iran-adamant-in-supporting-Syria-advisor
3) http://m.gulfnews.com/news/mena/syria/russian-turkish-agreement-would-keep-al-assad-in-power-1.1890011
4) http://app.ft.com/cms/s/810b4510-6ea4-11e6-9ac1-1055824ca907.html?ftcamp=crm/email//nbe/Analysis/product; https://americanfreepress.net/china-backs-russias-war-against-isis/ ;
5)http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/08/avoiding-war-after-war-syria/131078/?oref=d-channeltop; http://breakingdefense.com/2016/08/no-win-in-syria-well-be-glad-to-keep-assad/;
6) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TRCUO7-lbUE&sns=em @ 26min issue Syrian End Game
7) http://www.politico.eu/article/un-report-assad-again-used-chemical-weapons-defying-obama/?utm_content=bufferde55f&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer
8) http://sputniknews.com/russia/20160721/1043373832/russia-warned-turkey-coup-attempt.html; http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2016/08/30/turkey-s-new-relationship-with
@BG1
1) Did Putin and his intelligence apparatus, have either prior knowledge or, good reason to believe, that Erdogan "could/would" be subject to an attempted Military Coup(8)?
Based on this recent article that crossed my screen a few days ago, I am reasonably confident that Russian intelligence had prior knowledge of the coup. Replace Czech with Turkey.
EUObserver (opinion), September 2, 'Czech intelligence alarmed by Russian 'threat': https://euobserver.com/opinion/134890
See section on 'Russian Objectives'.
Thx 4 feedback. Helpful.